Publications

Kosterec, M. (2024): Transparent logics. Small Differences with huge Consequences. Brill: Leiden – Boston. ISBN: 978-90-04-70333-9. Available at: https://brill.com/display/title/70237

The book presents Transparent Intensional Logic in several of its latest realisations in such a way that it makes a case for the system and demonstrates how the theory can be applied to a wide range of cases. The work strikes a good balance between the philosophical-conceptual and the logical-formal. Transparent Logics prioritises depth over breadth and focuses on advanced formal semantics and philosophical logic, going beyond a mere introduction to the subject, but delving into the details instead.

Kosterec, M. (2024): Nontrivial Existence in Transparent Intensional Logics. European Journal of Analytic Philosophy 20(1). Available at: https://doi.org/10.31820/ejap.20.1.5

Abstract: The paper analyses the validity of arguments supporting the assumption of a constant universe of individuals over all possible worlds within Transparent Intensional Logic. These arguments, proposed by Tichý, enjoy widespread acceptance among researchers working within the system. However, upon closer examination, this paper demonstrates several weaknesses in the argumentation, suggesting that there is an open possibility to incorporate a variable universe of individuals even in models within this system.

Duží, M., Číhalová, M. (2024). Knowing who occupies an office: purely contingent, necessary and impossible offices. Synthese 203, 202 (2024). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-024-04596-x

Abstract: This paper examines different kinds of definite descriptions denoting purely contingent, necessary or impossible objects. The discourse about contingent/impossible/necessary objects can be organised in terms of rational questions to ask and answer relative to the modal profile of the entity in question. There are also limits on what it is rational to know about entities with this or that modal profile. We will also examine epistemic modalities; they are the kind of necessity and possibility that is determined by epistemic constraints related to knowledge or rationality. Definite descriptions denote so-called offices, roles, or things to be. We explicate these α-offices as partial functions from possible worlds to chronologies of objects of type α, where α is mostly the type of individuals. Our starting point is Prior's distinction between a 'weak' and 'strong' definite article 'the'. In both cases, the definite description refers to at most one object; yet, in the case of the weak 'the', the referred object can change over time, while in the case of the strong 'the', the object referred to by the definite description is the same forever, once the office has been occupied. The main result we present is the way how to obtain a Wh-knowledge about who or what plays a given role presented by a hyper-office, i.e. procedure producing an office. Another no less important result concerns the epistemic necessity of the impossibility of knowing who or what occupies the impossible office presented by a hyper-office.

Jespersen, B., Duží, M., & Carrara, M. (2024). Impossibilities without impossibilia. Inquiry, 1–38. https://doi.org/10.1080/0020174X.2024.2325617

Abstract: Circumstantialists already have a logical semantics for impossibilities. They expand their logical space of possible worlds by adding impossible worlds. These are impossible circumstances serving as indices of evaluation, at which impossibilities are true. A variant of circumstantialism, namely modal Meinongianism (noneism), adds impossible objects as well. These are so-called incomplete objects that are necessarily non-existent. The opposite of circumstantialism, namely structuralism, has some catching-up to do. What might a structuralist logical semantics for impossibilities without impossibilia look like? This paper makes a structuralist counterproposal. We present a semantics based on a procedural interpretation of the typed λ-calculus. The fundamental idea is that talk about impossibilities should be construed in terms of procedures: some yield as their product a condition that could not possibly have a satisfier, while the rest fail to yield a product altogether. Dispensing with a 'bottom' of impossibilia requires instead a 'top' consisting of structured hyperintensions, intensions, intensions defining other intensions, a typed universe, and dual (de dicto and de re) predication. We explain how the theory works by going through several examples.

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